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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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KEVAN BRUMFIELD, :

Petitioner : No. 13-1433

v. :

BURL CAIN, WARDEN. :

- - - - - x

Washington, D.C.

Monday, March 30th, 2015

The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 10:04 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

MICHAEL B. DeSANCTIS, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of Petitioner.

PREMILA BURNS, ESQ., Baton Rouge, La.; on behalf of Respondent.

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (10:04 a.m.)

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument  
4 this morning in Case 13-1433, Brumfield v. Cain.

5 Mr. DeSanctis.

6 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL B. DeSANCTIS

7 ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

8 MR. DeSANCTIS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may  
9 it please the Court:

10 The decision of the State court in this case  
11 was to not -- to deny Kevan Brumfield a hearing on his  
12 claim of intellectual disability. That decision was  
13 based on an entirely unreasonable determination of the  
14 facts of Brumfield's mental condition. The court  
15 specifically -- the court expressly stated in its decision  
16 to deny a hearing was, quote, "based on the three bases"  
17 that it laid out in its oral ruling at Page 172 of the  
18 Pet App. And I'd like to discuss each of those in turn.

19 The first basis given by the State court was  
20 that Brumfield scored a 75 on the Wechsler IQ Test.  
21 That's not just suggestive of intellectual disability;  
22 that's actual evidence of intellectual disability, and  
23 there was no testimony in the record to the contrary.  
24 This Court made it clear in Atkins, all of the clinical  
25 texts on which this Court relied on in Atkins make it

1 clear, and the Louisiana Supreme Court had made it clear  
2 in Williams and in Dunn.

3 The second basis for the State court's  
4 decision was that the defendant has not, quote,  
5 "demonstrated impairment based on this record in  
6 adaptive skills." To demand or even expect that blood  
7 from the stone of the pre-Atkins record where neither  
8 intellectual disability nor adaptive skills were even  
9 raised, is completely unreasonable. --

10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- I'm sorry, but  
11 isn't -- I -- I don't -- whether I agree with you or  
12 not, isn't it your burden to prove that he had some  
13 deficits in adaptive ability? You have to make the  
14 threshold showing.

15 MR. DeSANCTIS: Yes. There's a threshold  
16 showing under Louisiana law.

17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what did you show  
18 that met that prong in any way?

19 MR. DeSANCTIS: Sure. The standard under  
20 the Louisiana law is a low one. It's a burden of coming  
21 forward with some evidence of objective facts that put  
22 the movant's intellectual disability at issue.

23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, how is it --

24 MR. DeSANCTIS: It's not --

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How is that

1 determination under State law pertinent to the question  
2 here?

3 MR. DeSANCTIS: I was -- I was merely  
4 answering Justice Sotomayor's question as to what facts  
5 were put into evidence before the State court. I was  
6 setting the stage for the standard.

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I understand  
8 that. But given -- given the facts that were  
9 presented -- and this is what the language of the law  
10 is, of course. The evidence presented in the State  
11 court proceeding, how is that pertinent on the  
12 Federal -- Federal question?

13 MR. DeSANCTIS: We're --

14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: In other words, I  
15 don't think it would be a different -- your burden, I  
16 don't think, would be different on the question that's  
17 presented here if the State law required a higher  
18 threshold or -- or not.

19 MR. DeSANCTIS: And we're not requiring --  
20 we're not challenging the State law in this part of  
21 our --

22 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But in your answer to  
23 Justice Sotomayor, I -- I thought you said, well, if the  
24 State has a very low standard. What difference does  
25 that make? Are you saying that if the State with its

1 regular processes takes a Federal rule and misinterprets  
2 the rule as part of its process, then there's a Federal  
3 violation? Is that your point?

4 MR. DeSANCTIS: No. There -- there could be  
5 in that case, but that's not our --

6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What -- what --

7 MR. DeSANCTIS: -- but that's not our  
8 argument.

9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean, what -- what  
10 difference does it make -- and I think this was what the  
11 Chief Justice was concerned with as well. What difference  
12 does it make that Louisiana has a low bar or a high bar?

13 MR. DeSANCTIS: It -- it may not make a  
14 difference, Your Honor. And -- and it's not a --

15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: All right.

16 MR. DeSANCTIS: -- critical part of our  
17 argument. I will --

18 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And then while -- while  
19 you're on -- on this: Suppose at the trial, in the  
20 sentencing phase, an expert -- medical expert testified,  
21 in my view, this defendant does not have an intellectual  
22 disability as we define that in medical terms.

23 Would you be here?

24 MR. DeSANCTIS: We'd still be --

25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: That's a hypothetical of

1 course.

2 MR. DeSANCTIS: It's a hypothetical;  
3 obviously, that wasn't this case. There was no  
4 testimony at the State trial or sentencing about  
5 intellectual disability. But in that case, we probably  
6 still would be here because that's what happened in  
7 Williams. In the -- in Williams 1, the defense's own  
8 expert at trial, prior to Atkins, had testified that the  
9 defendant was not intellectually disabled, and yet the  
10 Louisiana Supreme Court sent it back for an Atkins  
11 hearing because Atkins had entirely changed the legal  
12 landscape. Now here --

13 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, the first question --  
14 the first question presented in your petition is  
15 "Whether a State court that considers the evidence  
16 presented at a petitioner's penalty phase proceeding as  
17 determinative of the petitioner's claim of intellectual  
18 disability under Atkins... has based its decision on an  
19 unreasonable determination of the facts."

20 So suppose that at the penalty phase  
21 proceeding there is evidence of 5 IQ tests, all above  
22 140. Would it be wrong to say that that's  
23 determinative?

24 MR. DeSANCTIS: Again, obviously not our  
25 case, but in that situation, we address that in our blue

1 brief. For the purpose of making clear that we are not  
2 asking for a bright-line rule, in a situation where  
3 there is uncontested -- uncontested evidence in the  
4 pre-Atkins record that disqualifies the individual from  
5 intellectual ability, if that were the case --

6 JUSTICE ALITO: So the answer to the first  
7 question is no, it is not necessarily unconstitutional  
8 to regard the penalty phase evidence as determinative.

9 MR. DeSANCTIS: It is in this case on this  
10 record, and Section (d) (2) is by its very nature a  
11 factual inquiry.

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is -- is your point --

13 MR. DeSANCTIS: So --

14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is your point that we are  
15 involved in a wholly different inquiry once Atkins is on  
16 the books? Because when you were before the State court  
17 at the sentencing hearing, you weren't talking about  
18 intellectual disability.

19 MR. DeSANCTIS: That's --

20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You were talking about  
21 some mitigating factors. So the State court never had  
22 before it an Atkins claim. An Atkins claim is raised  
23 for the first time on post-conviction review.

24 MR. DeSANCTIS: That -- that's exactly  
25 right. It's -- it's similar to the reasoning that this



1 Court adopted in Bobby v. Bies. And in precisely this  
2 setting, the Louisiana Supreme Court held -- or it  
3 explained that prior to Atkins, as Your Honor just  
4 explained, a defendant only had to show diminished  
5 capacity as a mitigating factor and wasn't called upon  
6 to marshal demonstrations of intellectual disability or  
7 impairment in adaptive skills.

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you not think it would  
9 have been ineffective assistance of counsel pre-Atkins  
10 for a lawyer who had a client who was severely mentally  
11 disabled not to bring that fact forward in the -- in the  
12 sentencing hearing for consideration by the jury?

13 MR. DeSANCTIS: Your Honor --

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Even -- even though it  
15 wasn't, you know, a mandatory Federal basis for -- for  
16 exempting him from the death penalty, surely you would  
17 want the jury to consider that kind of evidence,  
18 wouldn't you?

19 MR. DeSANCTIS: Your Honor, this Court in  
20 Henry and again in Atkins recognized that putting on a  
21 defense of, quote-unquote, "mental retardation," as the  
22 term was used at that time, is a double-edged sword.  
23 It's a much higher burden typically than the lower  
24 burden of putting on mitigating evidence of one's mental  
25 condition.

1           And -- which brings me to answer Justice --

2           JUSTICE SCALIA:           Well, I don't find that  
3 persuasive. It seems to me you -- you have the burden  
4 to show that there was some basis for the State Supreme  
5 Court coming out the other way, and that basis should  
6 have been in the record, according to the Federal  
7 statute, and your only defense is, well, we didn't put  
8 anything in the record because Atkins had not yet been  
9 decided.

10          MR. DeSANCTIS:           No, Your Honor. And that  
11 goes to Justice Sotomayor's question as well. There was  
12 overwhelming evidence of impairment of -- in adaptive  
13 skills and intellectual disability in the State court  
14 record --

15          JUSTICE SCALIA:           All right.

16          MR. DeSANCTIS:           -- before the State court  
17 judge. First --

18          JUSTICE SCALIA:           Fine. So let's get  
19 rid of that argument that Atkins had not been decided.  
20 That -- that had nothing to do with the case, right?

21          MR. DeSANCTIS:           Okay. Turning to the  
22 evidence in this case, first, it was evidence before  
23 the State court judge that Mr. Brumfield had a fourth  
24 grade reading level in terms of mere word recognition,  
25 not even comprehension. That's, again, actual evidence

1 of impairment in adaptive skills.

2 It was in the record before the State court  
3 that Mr. Brumfield, quote, "has a basic deficit  
4 somewhere in his brain." It was in the record in the  
5 State court that he had a very low birth weight that put  
6 him at risk of neurological trauma, and it was in the  
7 record from Dr. Bolter that Mr. Brumfield was in trouble  
8 many, many, many years ago.

9 The second expert before the State court,  
10 this is in the State court record, was Dr. Guin. She  
11 was a social worker. She didn't perform any tests of  
12 her own, but she found that Mr. Brumfield was sent to,  
13 quote, "special education from the third grade; that he  
14 had been placed in and out of mental hospitals because  
15 no one knew what to do with him throughout his childhood  
16 and youth; that his main problem was that he cannot  
17 process information the way normal people do." And  
18 that's -- that -- that is a key indicator of  
19 intellectual disability that this Court recognized twice  
20 in Atkins.

21 She testified that Brumfield -- before the  
22 State court, she testified that Brumfield needed someone  
23 to, quote, "help him function." That he did poorly even  
24 at recess as a child because he couldn't function with a  
25 lot of chaos around him. That age -- at age 11, one of

1 the mental institutions in which he had been placed,  
2 quote, "questioned his intellectual functions and noted  
3 his slowness in motor development." And that the  
4 nurses, literally from his birth, recognized that there  
5 was something wrong with him and that he was slower than  
6 normal babies.

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Am I wrong in my  
8 understanding that the record included an expert report  
9 stating that Brumfield possessed, quote, "a normal  
10 capacity to learn and acquire information" and that he  
11 had, quote, "adequate problem and" -- "and reasoning  
12 skill" -- "problem-solving and reasoning skills." Is --  
13 is -- is that correct?

14 MR. DeSANCTIS: Your Honor, if -- that's --  
15 I believe that's from the report of Dr. Jordan.  
16 Dr. Jordan did not testify in the State court  
17 proceeding. It's --

18 JUSTICE SCALIA: It -- it was not in the  
19 record?

20 MR. DeSANCTIS: It's actually an issue of  
21 debate whether Dr. Jordan's report was in the record.  
22 At the Federal hearing, the State conceded that it was  
23 not. And the -- and the judge doesn't -- the State  
24 court judge doesn't say he read it, although it was  
25 discussed by some of the experts, though not the -- the

1 portion you just read.

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, if it was in it, it's  
3 pretty categorical, you know. I would think that's  
4 enough for the State court to hang its hat on. I don't  
5 think we -- we can possibly find that it was  
6 unreasonable evidentiary finding, if -- if that was  
7 indeed in the record.

8 MR. DeSANCTIS: Your Honor, it -- it is,  
9 because, again, the burden --

10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Did -- did the State put  
11 it in the record?

12 MR. DeSANCTIS: No, there's no evidence,  
13 Your Honor, that the State put it in the record. They  
14 have claimed at various points in the proceeding --

15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And you didn't, but  
16 another -- another expert referred to it.

17 MR. DeSANCTIS: That's correct. Bolter --  
18 Dr. Bolter referenced Dr. Jordan's report regarding his  
19 IQ testing, that it was merely a screening test and he  
20 was dismissive of it.

21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the State wasn't --  
22 didn't put it in evidence, so it wasn't --

23 MR. DeSANCTIS: And they didn't -- and they  
24 did not --

25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And -- and are we talking

1 about the trial record now?

2 MR. DeSANCTIS: We're talking about the  
3 State trial record.

4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: At the sentencing -- at  
5 the sentencing hearing.

6 MR. DeSANCTIS: At the sentencing, that's  
7 correct.

8 Second, it -- it -- it is very relevant that  
9 the State court ignored all of the objective facts after  
10 the defendant had been required only to come on with  
11 some evidence. There's no indication in the State  
12 court's decision, which he explains precisely was based  
13 on the three factors that he just laid out.

14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Did you ask --

15 MR. DeSANCTIS: The State court did not --

16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Did you ask the State  
17 court for funds as a matter of Federal right? The other  
18 side says, did you ask for funds for State habeas only  
19 under State law and not under Federal law; is that true?

20 MR. DeSANCTIS: We requested funds  
21 repeatedly in -- in every petition before the court.  
22 And in doing so, at least six times we cited the  
23 Louisiana court of Deboe v. Whitley. That case  
24 discusses Ake and is based exclusively on Ake and  
25 Federal law. And this Court has made clear that if --

1 that a claim is preserved by citing a case that relies  
2 on the appropriate Federal law. So, yes.

3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. DeSanctis, I -- I  
4 will perhaps talk about what is a little confusing; if  
5 not confusing, disconcerting in this case. There seems  
6 to be an inequity that one could perceive that says you  
7 can use the penalty phase record, but the other side  
8 can't to challenge your conclusions. Because that's  
9 basically what you're saying. And so and that was, I  
10 think, Justice Alito's point, which is you concede on  
11 some -- in some circumstances the State might.

12 What makes your case different? Now, I do  
13 know that this -- in this case you're saying you  
14 provided some -- a sufficient amount of some evidence.

15 MR. DeSANCTIS: Correct.

16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And the State was  
17 unreasonable by not giving you a hearing to determine  
18 the merits of your claim.

19 MR. DeSANCTIS: Correct.

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. We don't  
21 even get to the issue of whether you were entitled to  
22 funds at that hearing, but I don't even think under  
23 Louisiana you wouldn't be, once you've made the  
24 threshold showing.

25 MR. DeSANCTIS: It's a distinct issue that

1 our question --

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Right.

3 MR. DESANCTIS: -- one does not depend on.

4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So answer my  
5 question, because it's -- it's a bit of a takeoff from  
6 Justice Alito's question, which is what is -- why in  
7 your case can't the State rely on the evidence in the  
8 penalty phase, if that's what you're relying on to make  
9 your sum showing?

10 MR. DeSANCTIS: There really is no inequity  
11 there, Your Honor. And I'm glad you asked. The  
12 Louisiana Supreme Court explained it in *Dunn*, which  
13 predated the State court's decision in this case by  
14 almost a year. The court explained that although the  
15 defendant was not called upon to offer proof of  
16 intellectual disability on -- at the trial prior to  
17 *Atkins*, the defendant did offer evidence of intellectual  
18 disability through that record. It was far less than  
19 the evidence that I just articulated.

20 From there, the court explained that it was  
21 improper for the State court to then weigh any contrary  
22 evidence without the guidance of experts and essentially  
23 make a diagnosis itself as to where -- whether the facts  
24 in the record are consistent or inconsistent with  
25 intellectual disability.



1 JUSTICE SCALIA: The court always has to do  
2 it itself, even when there are experts. I mean, I don't  
3 understand that.

4 MR. DeSANCTIS: Once the defendant comes  
5 forward with -- with some evidence, which Mr. Brumfield  
6 did here overwhelmingly, if there's contrary evidence in  
7 the record, that's what the hearing is for. And that's  
8 all we were asking. We weren't asking for --

9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Put this -- put this in  
10 perspective for a moment. Suppose we're in the district  
11 court on a petition for habeas.

12 MR. DeSANCTIS: Federal district court.

13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Federal -- United States  
14 district court, and the question is: Is the defendant  
15 entitled to a hearing? This petitioner entitled to a  
16 hearing?

17 what is the standard that the district  
18 court must find -- met before the district court has a  
19 hearing on the facts? Before the district court can  
20 have its experts. Does he have to find that the State  
21 collateral decision was clearly erroneous? Or that  
22 there was a prima facie evidence of -- of disability  
23 that the State collateral court ignored? What's the  
24 district court have to do before it decides it's going  
25 to have a hearing and call its own experts?

1 MR. DeSANCTIS: So --

2 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What standard must it meet  
3 and did it meet that standard here?

4 MR. DeSANCTIS: The answer to the final part  
5 of your question is yes. I would break it down this  
6 way: The -- the question of whether an individual is  
7 intellectually disabled this Court left to the States  
8 under Atkins. So the State standard is what applies for  
9 the showing that a defendant must make in order to prove  
10 his intellectual disability at the hearing.

11 If that occurs pre-Atkins as it did in this  
12 case and we get to Federal habeas, under 2254(d)(2), the  
13 Federal habeas judge looks at whether the factual  
14 determinations in this case of the defendant's mental  
15 condition were unreasonable. And here they were. The  
16 judge articulated three grounds, one of which was  
17 evidence of intellectual disability, one of which was  
18 irrelevant to the question of intellectual disability,  
19 and ignored a plethora of evidence in the record putting  
20 Mr. Brumfield's intellectual disability --

21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So are you saying --

22

23 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- that the district  
24 court, the United States district court decided to have  
25 a hearing because it found that the State court's

1 collateral review determination was, fill in the blank,  
2 clearly erroneous?

3 MR. DeSANCTIS: Was unreasonable.  
4 Unreasonable.

5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: That's the AEDPA standard.

6 MR. DeSANCTIS: That's the AEDPA standard  
7 and (d) (2) --

8 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Unreasonable because there  
9 were some open questions, or because no one could read  
10 the record to say that there was evidence that he had no  
11 disability?

12 MR. DeSANCTIS: Because the -- the State  
13 court judge in this case expressly indicated what his  
14 decision was based on. It was based on three bases, all  
15 of which are entirely unreasonable and no one could --  
16 no one could say that they support a claim that the  
17 defendant is not intellectually --

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Also, we've heard --  
19 heard a lot of discussion on the evidence at issue in  
20 this particular case. What -- what is the broader  
21 significance of that discussion here? I'm concerned  
22 your answer to Justice Alito was that the answer to  
23 your -- your first question was no, it's not necessarily  
24 the case that it's unreasonable determination in a  
25 situation where the State considers the evidence blah

1    blah.  But you're saying now that in this case it was?

2           MR. DeSANCTIS:            Correct.

3           CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:        So what is the  
4    broader significance of the question you want us to  
5    decide?  Since you've conceded that the question -- the  
6    answer to the first question presented is no.

7           MR. DeSANCTIS:            No.  I'm sorry, I certainly  
8    did not mean to concede that the answer to the first  
9    question presented is no.  My answer to Justice Alito's  
10   hypothetical was if there is uncontested evidence in the  
11   record --

12          CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:        Right, right.  But I  
13   mean --

14          MR. DeSANCTIS:            -- disqualifying  
15   intellectual disability, then --

16          CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:        Right.  But you --  
17   your question is:  If it's determinative, is it  
18   unreasonable?  And Justice Alito --

19          MR. DeSANCTIS:            That's right.

20          CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:        -- gave you an  
21   example of where it was determinative and you said it  
22   was not unreasonable.  So as a general rule, the  
23   question is -- the answer to the question is no.  And in  
24   terms of what we're going to decide, I just need to know  
25   whether it is simply whether the facts in your

1 particular case lead to a particular result, or if there  
2 is some more general legal rule that you're arguing for.

3 MR. DeSANCTIS: Section 2254(d)(2) is, on  
4 its face and by its text, a factual inquiry. And this  
5 Court need do nothing more than rule that what this  
6 judge did in this proceeding on this pre-Atkins record  
7 was unreasonable.

8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Can you go back to  
9 Justice Kennedy's question? And -- and either working  
10 it backwards or working it forward, but you're not  
11 taking it step by step, okay? Atkins I believe says  
12 that a State doesn't have to give you a hearing if you  
13 haven't met a threshold.

14 MR DeSANCTIS: That's correct.

15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And that's -- and that  
16 threshold definition is a reasonable --

17 MR. DeSANCTIS: No. The threshold  
18 definition in Louisiana --

19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Not Louisiana, Atkins.  
20 What did Atkins say?

21 MR. DeSANCTIS: Atkins doesn't -- Atkins  
22 doesn't articulate.

23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It doesn't, but it does  
24 articulate that there has to be a threshold and it has  
25 to be some doubt as to mental capacity, correct?

1 MR. DeSANCTIS: Some reason to believe that  
2 the individual is intellectually disabled.

3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Some reason to believe.  
4 So that was the standard. Some reason to believe that  
5 an individual's mental capacity is -- is compromised,  
6 correct?

7 MR. DeSANCTIS: Correct.

8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So is your first  
9 argument that there was enough evidence to have -- for  
10 you to have been entitled to a hearing?

11 MR. DeSANCTIS: That certainly is part of  
12 our argument, but it doesn't explain the entirety of the  
13 Federal error -- of the error recognized -- cognizable  
14 under Federal law --

15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Okay.

16 MR. DeSANCTIS: -- under Section (d)(2).

17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why don't you tell us the  
18 three -- you said that in the State habeas, there were  
19 three things that were unreasonable.

20 MR. DeSANCTIS: Correct.

21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So tell us what they  
22 were.

23 MR. DeSANCTIS: So the first -- this is on  
24 pages 171 and 172 of the Petition Appendix. The first  
25 was that Mr. Brumfield had an IQ score of 75. We know

1 as a matter of clinical fact that that is evidence of  
2 intellectual disability. The second --

3 JUSTICE ALITO: There was a second. Was  
4 there not testimony about a second IQ test that was a  
5 little bit higher?

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: 75 I thought.

7 JUSTICE ALITO: There was one that was 75.  
8 Was there another one that was higher than 75?

9 MR. DeSANCTIS: Not -- that came from  
10 Dr. Jordan who did not testify. And his report actually  
11 doesn't say what he scored there. And the evidence at  
12 trial that came out about it was Dr. Bolter saying what  
13 Dr. Jordan did was merely a screening test, which is not  
14 reliable anyway. So there is no other number in the  
15 record.

16 The second prong articulated by the State  
17 court was that Mr. Brumfield had not demonstrated  
18 impairment in adaptive skills. This Court, the  
19 Louisiana Supreme Court have all indicated that because  
20 Atkins changed the playing field, it is unjust and  
21 unreasonable to look to a pre-Atkins record for that  
22 determination. However, the record from that -- from  
23 that pre-Atkins trial and sentencing was replete with  
24 evidence which the -- which the State court never  
25 mentions in his decision.

1 JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought the former --

2 MR. DeSANCTIS: Third --

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought the former was  
4 that the question you sought to bring before us; namely,  
5 that the State court couldn't use it at all, period. I  
6 mean, question one that you -- you presented in your  
7 petition is as follows: "Whether a State court that  
8 considers the evidence presented at a Petitioner's  
9 penalty phase proceeding as determinative of the  
10 Petitioner's claim of intellectual disability under  
11 Atkins has based its decision on an unreasonable  
12 determination of the facts." Whether a State court, any  
13 State court, not this particular State court, but  
14 whether any State court that makes its decision based  
15 upon a pre-Atkins penalty phase hearing is  
16 automatically -- has automatically made an unreasonable  
17 determination of the facts. Wasn't that the question  
18 you presented?

19 MR. DeSANCTIS: We did not intend that  
20 the -- the question presented to be -- to sound more  
21 like a legal question that would become a matter of law.

22 JUSTICE SCALIA: Oh, fine. That's what it  
23 sounds like.

24 JUSTICE BREYER: I thought your case  
25 included the following: Atkins says you cannot sentence



1 to death and execute an intellectually disabled person.  
2 So Mr. Smith, whose case is not final, says to the  
3 judge, Judge, I would like to produce evidence I am  
4 intellectually disabled. The State says, no, you can't.  
5 That would clearly violate Atkins. Wouldn't it?

6 MR. DeSANCTIS: Correct.

7 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, suppose it says, yes,  
8 you can -- now, we don't have an Atkins. A standard  
9 which says when you do and when you don't have to state,  
10 let this person present evidence. We don't say it. But  
11 the State has found one. The State of Louisiana has a  
12 standard, and I take it if that's a good enough  
13 standard, that's what we should follow.

14 And that standard from State v. Williams  
15 says, we will give you a hearing, if you, Mr. Smith,  
16 provide objective factors that will put at issue -- put  
17 at issue, the fact of mental retardation. If you will  
18 come forward with some evidence to put your mental  
19 condition at issue. And so I guess, unless we think  
20 Louisiana can't use that standard, that that standard is  
21 good enough for Federal purposes. And, therefore, the  
22 issue is did your client and you put forward some  
23 evidence to put your mental condition at issue.

24 And as long as you came forward with some  
25 evidence, then unless we're prepared to write some new

1 Federal standard for when you have to give a hearing and  
2 when not, that's the question. And you're saying, among  
3 other things, of course, Judges -- you're telling us --  
4 of course we put forward some evidence. In fact, we  
5 think we put forward a lot more, and we would have put  
6 forward a lot more if the hearing hadn't been  
7 pre-Atkins. Isn't that your argument?

8 MR. DeSANCTIS: That is correct.

9 JUSTICE BREYER: Thank you.

10 MR. DeSANCTIS: That is our argument.

11 (Laughter.)

12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So let's get -- so let's  
13 get to --

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Thank you for putting it so  
15 clearly.

16 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, I think that's  
17 important that that be your argument--

18 MR. DeSANCTIS: Well, I don't want to --

19 JUSTICE BREYER: -- whether you say -- I  
20 mean, it's important if it really is your argument.

21 (Laughter.)

22 JUSTICE BREYER: And it is, isn't it?

23 MR. DeSANCTIS: I think it really is our  
24 argument.

25 JUSTICE ALITO: I don't want to intrude too

1 much on your rebuttal time, but as the case has been  
2 argued, I think you're making a strong argument that is  
3 purely a factual argument about this case, that you are  
4 not making an argument about the categorical --  
5 categorical rule about not considering evidence at a  
6 pre-Atkins penalty phase proceeding.

7 And unless you can point to precedent that  
8 shows that it was clearly established that you had a  
9 right to funding, then your -- your inability to put in  
10 evidence via the funding is not to be considered. And  
11 all that is before us is whether, on the evidence that  
12 was in the record at the State -- at a post-conviction  
13 proceeding, it was an unreasonable application of  
14 Federal -- of constitutional law. That's the question;  
15 right?

16 MR. DeSANCTIS: No, Your Honor.  
17 Respectfully, that would be under (d)(1). Under (d)(2)  
18 the question --

19 JUSTICE ALITO: All right. An unreasonable  
20 determination of fact.

21 MR. DeSANCTIS: Correct.

22 JUSTICE ALITO: But it's purely fact-bound.

23 MR. DeSANCTIS: Yes. That's the nature of  
24 (d)(2) and that's the question on which the this Court  
25 granted cert.

1 JUSTICE ALITO: There's no broader legal  
 2 issue involved here?

3 MR. DeSANCTIS: Not on (d) (1). Not on --

4 JUSTICE ALITO: No cross-cutting legal  
 5 issue?

6 MR. DeSANCTIS: Not on our first question  
 7 presented.

8 JUSTICE ALITO: On -- in the whole case?

9 MR. DeSANCTIS: Our -- our second question  
 10 presented is a question of whether the State court  
 11 application of Federal law was unreasonable contrary to  
 12 Federal law. We think it was, as spelled out in our  
 13 brief. But our first question presented does not depend  
 14 on that.

15 Mr. Chief Justice, I'll reserve my time for  
 16 rebuttal.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

18 Ms. Burns.

19 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PREMILA BURNS

20 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

21 MS. BURNS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it  
 22 please the Court:

23 I would like to just begin by recapping that  
 24 what is at issue here is whether the ultimate factual  
 25 conclusion that was made by the State habeas court, was

1 it reasonable and entitled to AEDPA deference under  
2 whatever viable support was available in that record?

3 The magistrate judge, on April the 15th of  
4 2008, in her recommendation to the district court, which  
5 was in fact adopted and signed off on by the district  
6 court, found that there was, in fact, failure to put  
7 forth objective factors in this case and that he should  
8 not been given an Atkins hearing.

9 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. But that's the  
10 standard. That's what I think -- the quest -- of course  
11 you can't know whether it's unreasonable or not  
12 unreasonable unless you know what standard you're trying  
13 to meet. And my impression is -- and that's why I went  
14 on at length, and you heard what I said -- and the --  
15 and it's really to you; I want to be sure he adopts  
16 it -- the standards seem to be the standard you are  
17 entitled to a hearing, says Louisiana, indeed a new one,  
18 if you meet the standard of State v. Williams.

19 MS. BURNS: If --

20 JUSTICE BREYER: And that seemed to me good  
21 enough to be a Federal standard in the absence of any  
22 other.

23 Now, am I right about that or wrong?

24 MS. BURNS: The -- the court -- the cases  
25 have held that for funding or for --

1 JUSTICE BREYER: Forget funding for the  
2 moment.

3 MS. BURNS: There must be sufficient factors  
4 set forth, objective factors, not mere conclusive.

5 JUSTICE BREYER: No. I agree with that. I  
6 just want to know factors to show what. And am I right  
7 in saying in the absence in Atkins of any standard about  
8 when you have to have a hearing, that the State standard  
9 is good enough. What he wants is a hearing. He doesn't  
10 want us -- he'd like it -- but he doesn't want -- we  
11 don't have to say whether this person is intellectually  
12 disabled or not. He wants a hearing. And there is  
13 nothing in Atkins that says what the standard is to give  
14 him a hearing. Therefore, I looked at the State  
15 standard from Williams and thought that's good enough to  
16 serve as a Federal standard. Now, am I right or wrong?

17 MS. BURNS: The standard is, under deference  
18 to the State, and to the State of Louisiana and to our  
19 mental retardation intellectual disability statute, that  
20 there are three prongs --

21 JUSTICE BREYER: No. No. You're not  
22 answering my question. Of course we defer to the State,  
23 and we defer to the State when it makes what judgment?  
24 The judgment you, Mr. Defendant, are not entitled to a  
25 hearing. So what's the standard under which they decide

1 whether he's entitled to a hearing or not?

2 MS. BURNS: The standard --

3 JUSTICE BREYER: And I thought it's State v.  
4 Williams. Am I right, or am I wrong?

5 MS. BURNS: The -- the -- the failure to  
6 meet an adaptive prong -- you have to put some evidence  
7 forward of this prong.

8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Excuse me. Are we going  
9 around in a circle, a little bit of a circle? It seems  
10 to me that if what happened here was the right thing,  
11 the Federal court went back and said, did the State  
12 properly preclude this Petitioner from putting on or  
13 discovering evidence? Did it improperly fail to hold a  
14 hearing? And the court there said, by the -- the  
15 courts -- by any standard, there was some  
16 evidence -- certainly by the State standard, but even by  
17 a constitutional standard, there was some evidence of  
18 incompetency. He was entitled to a hearing. They  
19 didn't give it to him, so now I will give him the  
20 hearing, because this is Federal habeas. And, in fact,  
21 we have said if a State improperly precludes you from  
22 developing a claim, then there is no deference owed to  
23 the State.

24 So what we're really looking at was, was the  
25 Federal hearing properly granted? You did not argue

1 that on the basis of the evidence produced at the  
2 Federal hearing, that this man was not intellectually  
3 disabled. You have put all your eggs in the basket of,  
4 on the record that didn't permit a hearing, he didn't  
5 make out a threshold finding. That's been your only  
6 defense so far.

7 MS. BURNS: But the two issues that were  
8 presented to the Fifth Circuit were both that there  
9 should have been -- there should never have been a  
10 hearing in this case, which is still our position, for  
11 failure to give deference under AEDPA; and secondly --

12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So if we disagree with  
13 that -- if we disagree with that, what are you left  
14 with?

15 MS. BURNS: Well, then it -- it needs to  
16 be -- if you find that there should have been a hearing,  
17 then you need to remand it back to the Fifth -- the  
18 Fifth Circuit for review of the facts.

19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why? Ah, to -- to view  
20 the conclusion from the facts developed there?

21 MS. BURNS: Absolutely. And, of course, our  
22 position to the Fifth Circuit was you should look at  
23 both of these issues. You look at AEDPA, and if you  
24 should find that there should have been a Federal  
25 hearing, then at that point we ask you to look to the



1 fact that he did not make a preponderance case, which  
2 they made a preliminary finding of in footnote 8.

3 JUSTICE BREYER: But that isn't -- that  
4 isn't -- at this moment, I'll put it once more, and see  
5 if I get an absolute, definite answer from you, and I'm  
6 overstating, but if I had to decide at this moment  
7 whether there is enough evidence for you to win on the  
8 point is he intellectually disabled, I would say you  
9 win. If I decide -- have to decide whether or not he  
10 presented enough evidence to get a hearing, I would say  
11 you lose.

12 Now, that's why it's important to me to  
13 know. Are we trying to decide here whether there was  
14 enough evidence, such that the State under Federal law  
15 was unreasonable in not granting him a hearing, there I  
16 look at the standards of Williams, and I think you lose.  
17 If we're deciding something else, like whether he's  
18 intellectually disabled, and I'm repeating myself, I  
19 think you win.

20 That's why I want your answer to the  
21 question of which are we deciding, or both.

22 MS. BURNS: The point is that no evidence,  
23 not one adaptive deficit was ever presented at State  
24 habeas.

25 JUSTICE KAGAN: But Ms. Burns -- Ms. Burns,

1 I think what Justice Breyer is driving at is just this,  
2 and reasonable people might disagree on the answer to  
3 this, but I think, you know, the determination that the  
4 State court was making at that moment was whether to  
5 have a hearing. And under Louisiana law, I don't think  
6 you disagree with this, I don't think anybody could  
7 disagree with this, under Louisiana law, you have a  
8 hearing when the defendant has come forward, and it's --  
9 the burden is on the defendant -- but when the defendant  
10 has come forward with some evident -- some evidence that  
11 raises a reasonable doubt as to his mental capacity.  
12 That's the standard that's in Williams, it's repeated  
13 again in Dunn. You don't agree -- disagree with that.

14 MS. BURNS: I do not, Your Honor.

15 JUSTICE KAGAN: And -- and so what Justice  
16 Breyer is suggesting is that when we -- when we realize  
17 that that's the determination that the State court is  
18 making, whether the defendant has come forward with some  
19 evidence putting his mental capacity at issue, it looks  
20 awfully like an unreasonable determination of facts to  
21 say that this record does not meet that standard.  
22 That's all that the case is about, isn't it?

23 MS. BURNS: I disagree. I disagree. This  
24 is almost a reverse Hall situation in the -- in the  
25 States looking at. Because if you look at Hall, Hall

1 was trying to rest totally on an IQ. Here he's trying  
2 to do the same thing to say, oh, there's a 75, possibly  
3 we concede a higher IQ than that. But Hall -- in Hall,  
4 there was a preclusion of the adaptive, as this Court  
5 has said is -- is integral to the showing, not one  
6 adaptive deficit --

7 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I think what --

8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the -- but  
9 adaptive -- adaptive was not relevant to the -- the  
10 determination at the sentencing hearing, because there  
11 was no Atkins. They were trying to show mental deficit,  
12 but they adapted something when we're making an Atkins  
13 determination. And there was -- that was never before  
14 the sentencing court. It's only after Atkins is decided  
15 that adaptive becomes -- becomes relevant.

16 But I didn't -- I wanted to ask you  
17 something in this record that's disturbing, and maybe  
18 you can explain it. There is a brief -- you know it;  
19 it's by Justice Calogero -- that says there were 18  
20 people who were sentenced to death and -- and before  
21 Atkins. Then Atkins is decided. Every one except for  
22 this Petitioner got a hearing in the State court; is  
23 that true?

24 MS. BURNS: That is not true. And if Your  
25 Honor will indulge me, I can go case by case. It will

1 eat into my time, but I'll be glad to do that. In  
2 Dunn --

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: Please don't.

4 (Laughter.)

5 MS. BURNS: In many of those cases, there  
6 was either a pretrial showing of mental retardation,  
7 something in the record that was serious, a diagnosis  
8 which was never present in this case. There was no  
9 mention of the word "intellectual disability" in Kevan  
10 Brumfield's case until June 16th of 2003, after Atkins  
11 was decided -- and that is the first time -- after  
12 Atkins was decided that he made this claim that says I  
13 have a 75 IQ, I have adaptive deficits without  
14 specifying one of them.

15 JUSTICE KAGAN: But --

16 MS. BURNS: And they were onset prior to 18.  
17 He did not meet his standard under Atkins.

18 JUSTICE KAGAN: But Ms. Dunn, if we could go  
19 back, just on this point: You said he didn't meet the  
20 standard. And the standard is, as Justice Breyer  
21 suggested and you agreed, the one that comes from Dunn.  
22 And what I understand Mr. Brumfield to be saying is,  
23 look, all I need is some evidence. The evidence that  
24 was in the trial record, even though it was pre-Atkins,  
25 the evidence was -- that was in the trial record was, I

1 had a very low IQ, 75. In addition, there was some  
2 evidence of -- of adaptive deficits, even -- even though  
3 they weren't trying to prove this point, evidence came  
4 in that he didn't read very well, he didn't write very  
5 well, he had problems processing information. So that  
6 there was all that evidence.

7 And then you sort of top -- when you look at  
8 the -- what the court said, I mean, basically, each one  
9 of the three things that the court said was just wrong.  
10 You know, the 75 is evidence of disability, there was  
11 evidence of adaptive functioning, and this idea that the  
12 court had that evidence relating to an antisocial  
13 personality somehow precluded the finding of mental  
14 disability is wrong as well.

15 So I guess the question that Justice  
16 Breyer's question really leads to is like: What's not  
17 some evidence here? And didn't the court just  
18 misunderstand what -- what record it was looking at and  
19 what it was doing?

20 MS. BURNS: I -- I would disagree,  
21 respectfully, and I would also ask this Court to  
22 remember that the court here looked at the entire record  
23 and that --

24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, that's the point. It  
25 seems to me --

1 MS. BURNS: That is the --

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's the point you have  
3 to attack. Does the State saying that there has to be  
4 some evidence, does that mean if there is one item of  
5 evidence -- even though it's outweighed by everything  
6 else, it's contradicted by other -- by other  
7 witnesses -- if there's one little peppercorn of  
8 evidence, you have to go on to a hearing? Is that what  
9 the State rule means? Or does it mean when you consider  
10 the entirety, including the rebuttal evidence -- - --

11 MS. BURNS: It is --

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- is there reasonably some  
13 evidence of his mental disability?

14 MS. BURNS: Justice Scalia, it is the  
15 entirety of the record.

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought that's what it  
17 was.

18 MS. BURNS: I am not --

19 JUSTICE KAGAN: Oh, sure, I consider the --

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Then -- then --

21 MS. BURNS: I cannot underscore that -- the  
22 first thing that the State did at the sentencing hearing  
23 was to reintroduce the 41 witnesses who testified, their  
24 testimony, as well as the 159 exhibits that went into  
25 the very sophisticated premeditated --

1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But wait a minute. Wait  
2 a minute.

3 MS. BURNS: -- planning in this prong.

4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But wait a minute. Then  
5 there is a legal question here. And the legal question  
6 is: Can a State make the final determination of -- of  
7 mental incapacity, or lack thereof, based on a trial  
8 record that did not address the issue? That was the  
9 question presented. And you're saying it can, and what  
10 your adversary is saying, if there is some evidence of  
11 mental incapacity, then I'm entitled to a separate  
12 hearing that addresses that question alone; I can put in  
13 additional evidence and contradict whatever happened at  
14 the penalty stage. That's what his point is. Why is he  
15 wrong?

16 MS. BURNS: He's wrong because that would  
17 require -- if mental retardation was not raised, which  
18 it could have been in this case as a mitigator, there's  
19 any other relevant mitigating circumstances if you --

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You don't disagree that  
21 in Williams and Dunn, your own supreme court said, it's  
22 a double-edged sword, and we don't expect counsel to  
23 raise an issue that doesn't get them off.

24 MS. BURNS: Justice Sotomayor, if I may  
25 disagree with that: The rationale of this Court in

1 Atkins is that we are an evolving, decent society that  
2 will not have a consensus to execute mentally retarded  
3 people.

4 JUSTICE BREYER: We're all on the same page.

5 MS. BURNS: That falls in the face -- that  
6 falls in the face of saying that juries, then, are  
7 inclined to execute them if they show some evidence of  
8 mental retardation.

9 JUSTICE BREYER: No, no. I think we're all  
10 on the same page here, and I think we've made some  
11 progress in this, because I agree with you, and I agree  
12 with Justice Scalia that what we have to do -and there  
13 isn't to - is to look at the whole record and see, keeping  
14 in mind the fact that it was a pre-Atkins record, and they  
15 didn't know about Atkins, but looking at the whole record,  
16 is the Louisiana court clearly wrong? Is it unreasonable  
17 in saying there wasn't enough evidence, even though there  
18 has to be some, which is up to them pretty much how they  
19 say the some, but they're unreasonable in saying that  
20 there wasn't some evidence justifying a hearing. And  
21 the only way to do that is for us to read it. Is -- is  
22 that right?

23 MS. BURNS: The record has to be read.

24 JUSTICE BREYER: Would you agree with that?

25 MS. BURNS: I would agree that the --



1 JUSTICE BREYER: I agree with that.

2 MS. BURNS: -- entirety of the record has  
3 got to be read. It cannot be taken in a vacuum as  
4 counsel would have you believe that this judge was  
5 myopic.

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: I haven't read the whole  
7 record, you know, and I doubt that I'm going to. And --  
8 and I doubt that this Court is going to read the whole  
9 record in all of these Atkins cases in the future. I  
10 mean, what -- what you're saying is -- is -- you don't  
11 think it's -- it's fantastical?

12 MS. BURNS: I do, Your Honor. And that's --  
13 that's my whole point, is if you make the argument that  
14 in every one of these cases where mental retardation was  
15 not raised as an issue, it opens the floodgates for  
16 every pre-Atkins case to have to be reexamined, to have  
17 to be given a hearing.

18 JUSTICE SCALIA: No. No.

19 JUSTICE BREYER: Not every one. They want  
20 to do this one, and I --

21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: The Petitioner -- the  
22 Petitioner's counsel conceded that if in this hearing,  
23 at the sentencing hearing, medical evidence was that in  
24 the opinion of the expert witness, this defendant, it --  
25 has no intellectual disability, this would be a

1 different case. That's not in this case. And what is  
2 in this case -- and you have still not answered Justice  
3 Breyer's question echoed by Justice Kagan. Don't we  
4 look at Dunn and Williams to see what the standard is?

5 MS. BURNS: Absolutely.

6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And you have not said yes,  
7 and you have not said no.

8 MS. BURNS: Yes. That is the law.

9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: All right.

10 MS. BURNS: But that still requires him to  
11 come forward with not just some evidence, but  
12 significant factors, significant objective factors to  
13 trigger that hearing.

14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But he had no money to do  
15 it. He said, if I had money I would investigate and I  
16 would come up with a lot more than I did at the  
17 sentencing hearing, but the State won't give me any  
18 money.

19 MS. BURNS: Justice Ginsburg, if I may  
20 address this issue, because unlike the majority of cases  
21 that this Court has analyzed in an AEDPA deference,  
22 although under a Strickland umbrella normally in terms  
23 of mitigation and ineffectiveness of counsel, by filing  
24 separate claims for funding, this man was awarded at --  
25 at the time of this trial, approximately \$10,000 in

1 funding, which would be approximately \$30,000 today, for  
2 investigators, for investigative services, for a  
3 sociologist who was board certified for two  
4 neuropsychologists.

5 And Dr. Guin testified she conducted 28 to  
6 32 interviews. She procured every medical, school  
7 record that included prior psychiatric and psychological  
8 analyses of this defendant --

9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What addition --

10 MS. BURNS: -- including what was --

11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What was there in  
12 addition that was put in? He did get funding when he  
13 was in Federal court.

14 MS. BURNS: No. He got funding in the  
15 State. This is in the State court to flesh out any  
16 possible defense --

17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I'm not talking about the  
18 sentencing hearing. I'm talking about the Federal  
19 habeas. What -- what, was there additional evidence?

20 MS. BURNS: That was just -- apparently that  
21 they just showed up and they had the money. There was  
22 never -- there was never a hearing. He showed up one  
23 day, he got the -- he got the experts, and I don't know  
24 how the funding was granted, because he just showed up  
25 with those reports, filed them into -- as an amended

1 habeas, in -- in State -- in district court, and as a  
2 result of the reports that he got independently, that's  
3 what triggered --

4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Didn't counsel --

5 MS. BURNS: -- in the court hearing.

6 JUSTICE ALITO: In the State --

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Go ahead.

8 JUSTICE ALITO: In the State court, did  
9 Petitioner say, give me a hearing, and if you do, I will  
10 produce additional evidence without having funding? Or  
11 did he say, give me a hearing and if you -- and provide  
12 me with funding so that I can put in additional  
13 evidence?

14 MS. BURNS: He made a vague -- in his very  
15 first habeas petition, and this went on for a period of  
16 44 months. The first petition says, I need about 10  
17 different types of experts and probably will need money.  
18 Then he filed four motions to continue, saying, I am  
19 still reviewing this record and I do not know what  
20 experts I will be needing.

21 Then when he came in on the hearing, there  
22 was never -- although there was a claim at the very,  
23 very end; claim 105, which was the last claim -- he  
24 never -- he never filed a separate Ake motion as had  
25 been done in everything pre-trial in this case. He just

1 came in, he sat mute, he didn't say to the judge which  
2 was -- which would be the Louisiana standard, Your  
3 Honor, you -- you need to rule on this ahead of time, I  
4 still need time to investigate. There was never any  
5 kind of objection, any kind of moving for the funds or  
6 any kind of specificity. And as a result of that, the  
7 reviewing State habeas court dismissed those claims with  
8 prejudice for failure to make them out with  
9 particularity.

10 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I see a -- unless we  
11 know the answer to that question, I don't know how we  
12 can answer the question of whether there should have  
13 been a hearing. If he wasn't going to produce anything  
14 more at the hearing, then what was already in the  
15 record, there would be no point in granting a hearing.  
16 And so if the only purpose of the hearing was to allow  
17 him to put in additional evidence with funding, case  
18 comes down to the question whether it was  
19 unconstitutional -- whether under AEDPA it was clearly  
20 established that it was unconstitutional for the State  
21 court to deny funding for this purpose.

22 MS. BURNS: There was never -- my -- and my  
23 point again, is just as he did not make the threshold  
24 for the Atkins hearing, he did not make any kind of  
25 threshold and showing of specificity for any expert

1 funding. You just -- you just don't have --

2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Because, Ms. Burns, wouldn't  
3 it be right to think, sure, he'd rather have had  
4 funding, but he wanted the hearing regardless of whether  
5 he was going to get funding. And he can go out and seek  
6 pro bono support. He could try to go back to the same  
7 experts that he had used at the sentencing.

8 So even without funding, the opportunity for  
9 a hearing might have been worth something to him. And  
10 what's clear, isn't it, this is the -- you said  
11 that there is questions as to whether he asked for  
12 funding or didn't ask for funding. What's clear is that  
13 he asked for a hearing, isn't that right?

14 MS. BURNS: He did ask for a hearing. But  
15 to get a hearing, again, you have to meet a threshold.  
16 And I might add to the Court that it would have been, as  
17 in many other cases, a relatively simple matter to go  
18 back, to have approached Dr. Bolter, Dr. Jordan, Dr.  
19 Guin and just said, look, a case named Atkins has come  
20 out in 2002. You have previously evaluated this  
21 defendant; would it now make any difference to you, in  
22 view of the holding in that case, would you, just say in  
23 a letter --

24 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, often in -- often, in  
25 order to obtain, a hearing a party whom is moving for a

1 hearing has to make a proffer of what will be shown at  
2 the hearing. It makes no sense to say we're going to  
3 have a hearing and I want a hearing and I have the  
4 burden of proving at the hearing that I'm entitled to  
5 something, but I don't have any evidence to prove the --  
6 the point that I need to prove.

7 MS. BURNS: And my --

8 JUSTICE ALITO: So it does seem to come down  
9 to funding, unless there is something in the -- in the  
10 record, and maybe you or your counsel can point to  
11 something in the record that shows that he wanted a  
12 hearing, even if he wasn't going to have funding.

13 MS. BURNS: He proceeded with the hearing  
14 that day with -- without making any type of objection  
15 and proceeded to the merits. He -- he, first of all,  
16 did not file any separate Ake claim. I -- I'd consider  
17 that very important, because that -- that was the  
18 procedure that was followed --

19 JUSTICE SCALIA: You're saying he doesn't  
20 want funding. He didn't want funding, you're saying,  
21 right?

22 MS. BURNS: No. He -- he made a nebulous  
23 claim for funding, and said, Well, you know I'm  
24 reviewing this, I don't know what experts I --

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: You say he proceeded

1 without it, so --

2 MS. BURNS: Yes, he did.

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: So he didn't want funding.

4 Ms. BURNS: He --

5 JUSTICE SCALIA: That doesn't help your  
6 case. It hurts your case.

7 MS. BURNS: He proceeded to the hearing that  
8 day.

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, in looking  
10 at the record, what are we supposed to do with  
11 Dr. Jordan's report?

12 MS. BURNS: Might I -- might I direct this  
13 Court to the magistrate judge's recommendation which is  
14 found -- it's document 37, page 17, footnote 7, where  
15 she references a certain page of Dr. Jordan's report.  
16 And it's -- we don't know. It -- it is a defendant's  
17 burden when we file for discovery to at least file  
18 whatever reports are going to be used --

19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, that's a bit of  
20 a copout. You're the prosecutor. Was it admitted at  
21 trial -- at the sentencing?

22 MS. BURNS: It was not admitted --

23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: At the sentencing  
24 hearing?

25 MS. BURNS: -- as evidence.



1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Right.

2 MS. BURNS: But she had a copy of it and as  
3 Dr. --

4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But it was not before  
5 the State court?

6 MS. BURNS: Apparently it -- it was viewed  
7 by the judge. You can still have -- if it's not  
8 introduced as evidence by either party during the trial,  
9 it can still be filed as part of an answer and be part  
10 of that trial record which the court reviews.

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: There was -- it was  
12 discussed during -- I gather, during cross-examination  
13 several times. What is the status of documents that are  
14 the subject of cross-examination under Louisiana law?  
15 Are they part of the record? Are they simply extraneous  
16 material that can be consulted? What -- what are they?

17 MS. BURNS: If -- of course, the rule -- the  
18 rule is, if someone has relied upon a report as both  
19 Dr. Bolter and -- and Dr. Guin did in this case, and the  
20 report had been tendered to maybe -- the Jordan report,  
21 we had the right --

22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The report had been  
23 tendered what?

24 MS. BURNS: The report had been tendered to  
25 the State, after -- after much argument. They did not

1 want to tender that report. But we had a copy of it,  
2 because I very -- I think, very repletely cross-examined  
3 Dr. Guin.

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm waiting for the last  
5 half of your sentence. If -- right? -- if a witness  
6 testified about it and if it was tendered to the court,  
7 then what is the conclusion?

8 MS. BURNS: You can -- you can, of course,  
9 use that report.

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: And it becomes part of the  
11 record?

12 MS. BURNS: Yes, it does.

13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay.

14 MS. BURNS: Absolutely. Absolutely.

15

16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: We were told that the  
17 three reasons given by the State habeas court, that all  
18 of those, the three, were wrong. That's what the  
19 counsel for the Petitioner told us.

20 And what is your -- your response to that?  
21 75, we know that it isn't an absolute, that you can have  
22 a 75 score and still be intellectually disabled.

23 MS. BURNS: 75 is, of course, within the  
24 range, and what's noticeably been -- been absent from  
25 this record in reply brief is that everything's been

1 taken down the five points by the SEM. But we never  
2 hear in these cases that truly are argued that the SEM  
3 can go up the five points. The first test that this  
4 defendant was administered, when he was 11, which was a  
5 WISC, there was -- there was no number put down, but the  
6 doctor opined that it was a dull normal, which would be  
7 an 80 to an 89, which is more consistent, if we took the  
8 five points up from -- from the 75 that Dr. --  
9 Dr. Jordan -- Dr. Bolter did.

10 And additionally, we also -- well, there  
11 was -- there was additional evidence, of course, at the  
12 Federal hearing that would put it more in that upper  
13 range, I believe.

14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. Could I go  
15 back to your answer to Justice Scalia?

16 It -- I've practiced elsewhere, and if  
17 anything's made a part of the record, you give it an  
18 evidence number. Louisiana is different; it's not --  
19 it's not introduced into evidence?

20 MS. BURNS: No.

21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You just --

22 MS. BURNS: No. Not necessarily. No. The  
23 Guin report was not introduced by the defense into  
24 evidence. I will refer to coroner's reports, crime lab  
25 reports. I do not necessarily file them into evidence.

1 What I do is, as part of the answer to discovery, we  
2 attach them. They are part of the record. That is --  
3 that is Louisiana procedure.

4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: As the answer -- but how  
5 do we know the trial judge read it?

6 MS. BURNS: Because he said so. First of  
7 all, under *Harrington v. Richter*, it is the ultimate  
8 conclusion, the factual conclusion reached by the court,  
9 not necessarily the language that he used. It does not  
10 require that each and every ground that he relied on be  
11 articulated.

12 And the court stated in his rulings that, I  
13 have examined this record. It says, I've looked at the  
14 application, the response, the record, which in this  
15 case, just to educate the Court as to Louisiana habeas  
16 procedure, if a habeas judge is reviewing, he would get  
17 the 16 initial volumes of the case. There were four  
18 additional supplemental volumes. That includes  
19 everything from indictment to pretrial discovery, any  
20 answers, documents that were filed in answer to that.  
21 It includes the testimony during any suppression or  
22 funding hearings. It includes the voir dire, which in  
23 this case was 13 days. It includes the guilt phase,  
24 which was six days. And the penalty phase --

25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Can we go back to --

1 you're answering my question, and then -- and you told  
2 me the 75 IQ, but there were two others.

3 MS. BURNS: Yes.

4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: There was nothing on  
5 adaptive behavior, but in fact, there was evidence --  
6 some evidence of adaptive behavior. And then the third  
7 point, antisocial behavior, there's nothing inconsistent  
8 about being antisocial and having an intellectual  
9 disability.

10 MS. BURNS: There is. And it was simply --  
11 I think -- I don't think you can necessarily fault the  
12 court for saying that. He's just simply reciting that  
13 there was a finding in this case, because every  
14 doctor -- every --

15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the finding is  
16 perfectly consistent with -- with intellectual  
17 disability.

18 MS. BURNS: This individual was examined  
19 five times prior to the age of 18. He was given a WISC.  
20 Nobody found the words "intellectual disability." In  
21 fact --

22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Because Atkins wasn't  
23 decided?

24 MS. BURNS: No. Mental -- mental  
25 retardation has existed since the beginning of time. It

1 does not require the Atkins case to come into play.

2 Nobody found him to be intellectually  
3 disabled. What they did find was conduct disorder,  
4 hyperactivity, under-socialized, aggressive, and then as  
5 an adult, that morphed into antisocial personality  
6 behavior. They are two -- also two separate and  
7 distinct items. And that is -- that is contained in the  
8 Louisiana statute on intellectual disability, that  
9 certain things like learning disabilities,  
10 environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage,  
11 emotional stress in the home or school, difficulty in  
12 adjusting to school, behavioral disorders, and other  
13 mental types of behavior, psychoses, are not necessarily  
14 indicative.

15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

16 Mr. DeSanctis, you have two minutes  
17 remaining.

18 MS. BURNS: Thank you, Your Honor.

19 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MR. DeSANCTIS

20 ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

21 MR. DeSANCTIS: Thank you, Mr. Chief  
22 Justice.

23 First, the -- Dr. Jordan's report was not in  
24 the record, and that is made clear at the Petition  
25 Appendix 39a, note 13, where the court noted that

1 counsel recognized that it was not in the record.

2 Second, counsel articulated that there were  
3 scores -- IQ scores in the -- in the 80s and 90s.  
4 That's not correct. Federal -- volume I of the Federal  
5 hearing at page 57 shows that there were two other  
6 tests: One a 75, and one a 54.

7 Finally, I want to emphasize that this Court  
8 recently recognized that it's unconstitutional to create  
9 an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual  
10 disability will be executed. The State court's  
11 determination of the facts in this case created  
12 precisely that risk. And now that we're here, it's not  
13 just risk; it's certainty. The only court to provide  
14 Mr. Brumfield with a hearing found that he is  
15 intellectually disabled, and unless this Court reverses  
16 the Fifth Circuit's erroneous ruling, an intellectually  
17 disabled person will be executed.

18 Thank you.

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.  
20 The case is submitted.

21 (Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the case in the  
22 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

23

24

25

A				
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